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Acquiring Pharmaceutical Industry Assets in the UK: 1 + 1 5 1?
Panos Kanavos • Aris Angelis
 The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The recent AstraZeneca takeover bid from
Pfizer puts pharmaceutical R&D once again on the public
agenda. Three pertinent questions are (a) what can be
expected from this acquisition, (b) what are the implica-
tions for the UK economy and science base, and
(c) whether such a deal should go ahead. Although the key
driver behind this acquisition would be an improvement in
company performance and shareholder value, past evi-
dence suggests that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of
large pharmaceutical companies imply a neutral net effect
on productivity, if not a decline, with employment
decreasing and R&D spend following a similar trend.
Similarities between the two companies include dropping
sales; however, relative to its size, AstraZeneca has a more
promising R&D pipeline, especially in therapeutic areas
where Pfizer’s strength is currently limited (e.g. oncology).
Ensuring a portfolio diversification would make Pfizer’s
takeover proposal a knight’s one, but history points
towards a knave-like behavior.
1 Introduction
The recent debate about Pfizer’s proposed takeover of the
UK-based AstraZeneca felt like history repeating itself: in
late January 2009 Pfizer acquired Wyeth to create one of
the leading global pharmaceutical conglomerates and a few
years before that, it also acquired Pharmacia (2003) and
Warner Lambert (2000). The combined company that
would emerge would be the largest pharmaceutical in terms
of sales revenue and R&D budget. A number of questions
arise however, about the value of such a merger and its
impact both in corporate, but, more importantly, in social
terms: the first relates to the expectations from and the
wider implications of such a takeover, should it happen in
the future; as a result of these, the second question relates
to whether it should be allowed to go ahead. In the sections
that follow we discuss the above questions and outline our
rationale for the takeover not necessarily being in the UK
economy’s best interests.
2 Expectations from a Likely Takeover of AstraZeneca
from Pfizer
As things currently stand, both Pfizer and AstraZeneca
have similarities: total sales in both have declined by about
a quarter (24 and 23 % for Pfizer and AstraZeneca
respectively) since 2010 (Table 1) [1, 2]; R&D budgets
have also suffered as a result, showing a declining trend;
but profits have been resilient in both cases. The two firms
also have differences; among them an important difference
is that, relative to its size, AstraZeneca has a more prom-
ising R&D pipeline than Pfizer with several molecules in
late stage development—particularly in oncology—and
more drugs at registration phase (Table 2) [1, 2]. If a
promising R&D pipeline is a signal towards future market
strength and sustainable profitability over the long term,
then AstraZeneca is certainly a good bargain for the
American conglomerate.
In light of the above, what can one expect from this
deal? Again, history offers interesting insights. First, the
key driving force for this acquisition appears to be
improvements in company performance and shareholder
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value, mainly through economies of scale, removal of
duplication in R&D, cost optimisation or reduction,
increased tax efficiency and leveraging synergies, poten-
tially leading to higher sales and greater market shares in
the global pharmaceutical marketplace. However, evidence
suggests that, for large companies, acquisitions in the
pharmaceutical industry lead predominantly to an output
decline of new molecular entities (NME) and, for mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) overall there does not appear to be
a net effect on productivity [3], in other words value is
neither created nor destroyed [4]. Second, employment is
likely to decline and R&D spend could also suffer as a
result. After acquiring Wyeth in 2009, Pfizer reduced its
total workforce at the end of 2013 by 36 % to a total of
about 77,700 [1]. This was accompanied by a 41 %
reduction in overall R&D spend: from a combined spend-
ing of $11.3 billion at the end of 2008 before the acqui-
sition, to $6.7 billion at the end of 2013. Declining R&D
spend is not always the case post-M&A, but Pfizer’s
direction of travel seems to be going in the same direction:
following its three largest acquisitions (Warner-Lambert,
Pharmacia, and Wyeth), numerous R&D sites were shut
down and the decrease in R&D spend could explain the
reduced output observed post-M&A. In the case of Phar-
macia, the Swedish Prime Minister referred to his country’s
‘‘negative experience’’ when Pfizer failed to honour its
commitments following Pharmacia’s takeover [5],
although much of that could be attributed to failure to bring
new products to market.
3 Implications for the UK Economy
The acquisition of AstraZeneca will ensure the sustain-
ability of Pfizer’s current business model, including a
greater portfolio diversification in areas where Pfizer’s
strength is currently limited, e.g. in oncology. But there is
much in Pfizer’s takeover proposal pointing to a knave-like
behaviour. For one, history is not on its side: the closure of
the R&D plant in Sandwich in the UK 3 years ago is still a
fresh—and for many, painful—memory. This took place at
the time when UK health and industrial policy for the
pharmaceutical sector was ambivalent about the future of
the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS),
predicting its abolition over the mid- to long-term.
Table 1 Total sales, total R&D expenses and total workforce
2008–2013
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total sales ($ billion)
Pfizer 48.3 50 67.8 61 54.7 51.6
AstraZeneca 31.6 32.8 33.3 33.6 28 25.7
Total R&D expenses ($ billion)
Pfizer 7.9 7.8 9.4 8.7 7.5 6.7
AstraZeneca 5.2 4.4 5.3 5.5 5.2 4.8
Total R&D spending (% revenues)
Pfizer 16.5 15.7 13.9 14.2 13.7 12.9
AstraZeneca 16.5 13.4 15.9 16.4 18.6 18.7
Workforce (total, 1000 s)
Pfizer 81.8 116.5 110.6 103.7 91.5 77.7
AstraZeneca 66.1 63.9 61.0 57.2 51.7 51.5
Source: Company financial and annual reports [1, 2]
Table 2 R&D pipelines of
Pfizer and AstraZeneca, 2014
Source: Company financial and
annual reports [1, 2]
a Other areas mainly include
rare diseases, vaccines and
biosimilars in the Pfizer
pipeline, and infection in the
AstraZeneca pipeline
All
areas
Cardiovascular
and metabolism
Oncology Neuroscience
and pain
Respiratory,
inflammation,
immunology
Other
areasa
Phase I
Pfizer 35 3 6 8 6 12
AstraZeneca 32 2 14 2 8 6
Phase II
Pfizer 23 4 4 4 8 3
AstraZeneca 28 3 9 2 12 2
Phase III
Pfizer 20 2 8 4 3 3
AstraZeneca 16 0 8 0 6 2
Registration
Pfizer 6 1 0 2 0 3
AstraZeneca 8 4 2 1 0 1
Total
Pfizer 84 10 18 18 17 21
AstraZeneca 84 9 33 5 26 11
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Beyond operational efficiency and the long term sus-
tainability of Pfizer’s business model, two additional
arguments make a deal attractive for Pfizer: first, tax
optimisation and efficiency and, second, the additional
financial incentives provided by the new PPRS.
It is unsurprising that achieving greater efficiency in
managing its tax obligations, through tax or corporate
inversion, must have been a key consideration in Pfizer’s
pursuits to acquire assets outside the United States, where it
is tax-resident. For sure, Pfizer has accumulated significant
reserves from its international business over the past
5 years, which, if re-patriated to the US, will be taxed at
the going rate (35 %). A likely acquisition of AstraZeneca
could signal the movement of Pfizer’s headquarters to the
UK, where the corporate tax rate is significantly lower than
the one the company faces in the US. Additionally, the US
tax code, perhaps uniquely among developed nations, seeks
to impose income tax on profits earned abroad by Ameri-
can corporations. Companies with strong international
orientation, such as Pfizer, have a strong incentive to re-
classify themselves as ‘foreign’ in order to avoid the bur-
den of double taxation and return some of the profits to
their investors. One can hardly blame Pfizer for this
inconsistency in the US tax code. In fact, several other
companies have strived to do the same in recent months or
years, for example, Medtronic (acquiring Ireland-based
Covidien) and Abbvie (acquiring UK-based Shire) and the
only way for the practice to stop would be to either reform
the US tax code or altogether disallow tax inversions. A
favourable reform of the US tax code appears unlikely as
the US authorities continue to push for legislation that
could retroactively strip the tax advantages achieved by
companies in some of the 2014 deals [6]. In the meantime,
no direct pecuniary benefit to the UK economy is likely to
emerge from a likely deal with AstraZeneca, although
shareholders (in the UK and elsewhere) and large (mostly
private and some public) institutional investors will realise
a short-term benefit equal to the difference in the share
price, discounting AstraZeneca’s portfolio and future
launches.
Considering the wider economic and social impact of
such an important deal, it should be expected that the UK
government’s involvement will be substantive and focus on
maximising the likely benefits to UK PLC. While free
market economics, backed by acquiescing politics, usually
determine the outcome of M&A, the UK government, as a
guardian of health and industrial policy for the pharma-
ceutical sector has a legitimate right to become involved in
discussions aiming to secure a better deal for long-term
employment, research, production and exports. As a result
such an involvement is in the public interest. After all, in
the wake of the recent financial crisis, there is great interest
in holding banking executives to account for messed-up
mergers and unfulfilled commitments. In preventing simi-
lar blunders by pharmaceutical industry executives, the
scope and extent of likely commitments could be defined
ex ante and monitored after they have taken place.
In a likely future takeover proposal, investors will
demand a leaner organization post-takeover in order to
retain and possibly enhance profitability and sustain this for
a few more years until new products emerge to replenish an
ageing product portfolio. Whereas human capital might
suffer for the sake of improving operational efficiency,
physical capital might not, at least in the short term. The
new PPRS, which became operational on January 1st,
2014, allows a 21 % rate of return on capital employed
(ROCE) on sales to the UK NHS. Scheme members will be
able to retain profits of up to 150 % of this target and may
even be able to apply for price increases if they forecast
profits less than 50 % of this target [7]. As a result, a
combined company with a broader physical capital base
may be able to make more flexible use of capital, as per the
current PPRS arrangements, allowing an additional tax
optimization up to a point. But a rationalization of sales
forces and, potentially, R&D activities is also a strong
possibility, implying losses in different parts of the world.
It is highly unlikely that the UK R&D operations will
escape unscathed as both companies have research facili-
ties in the Cambridge area.
4 Long-Term Concerns
Despite the obvious tax advantages for Pfizer and the
incentives provided by the UK institutional framework,
becoming part of a corporate global empire could have
negative implications for creativity and entrepreneurship.
While scale effects are usually a key driver of corporate
M&A, it is doubtful that the same argument holds in
research activities, where individuality and small team
spirit often drive innovation and discovery. This gives
credence to the ‘small is beautiful’ argument [8] as
opposed to ‘big is better’. Consequently, it is not neces-
sarily the case that merging the activities of two large
pharmaceutical manufacturers such as Pfizer and Astra-
Zeneca will create additional value and greater impact
further down the line.
Whereas it is obvious why AstraZeneca may be a good
bargain for Pfizer, it is unclear how the UK economy and
its science base may benefit and what the implications are
for overall industrial policy. When listening to Pfizer’s
CEO before the House of Commons Business, Innovation
and Skills (BIS) Select Committee, one cannot help but
share MPs’ worries. For sure, Pfizer cannot promise much
about its UK presence over the long-term unless some
specific targets are put forward and discussed upfront in
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order to create a win-win scenario for all stakeholders.
Such targets could embrace new products, new research
lines of investigation based on research priorities and,
potentially, new markets.
5 Conclusion
In a globalized economy, conglomerates such as Pfizer can
almost free-ride on the back of successful government
policies and incentives for biomedical innovation. For
ventures like this not to end up being a zero-sum game, one
can only hope that the scientific excellence the UK pro-
duces and the incentives provided for this purpose will
continue to deliver first class research outcomes in the
future. Additionally, governments (particularly the UK
government) as sponsors of policies promoting research,
innovation and entrepreneurship, have a legitimate right to
have some say on the terms of M&A taking place in their
territory and ensure that the benefits from such deals dif-
fuse more widely in society.
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